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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
MONNA McBROOM,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No.

v.

9702

HOWARD KIRTLEY McBROOM
Defendant and Appellant.
PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT'S
ANSWERING BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
With reference to the statement of facts as
given by the defendant and appellant, the defendant
has not attempted to set forth facts, but rather to
malign the plaintiff with generalities which are not
supported by the record and certainly in no sense
supported by the findings of fact which were entered
and signed by the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson.
In this regard the plaintiff feels it necessary to
answer the defendant's statements in order that the
court will not be mislead into believing the generalities which defendant has set forth.
It is true the court found for the defendant with
1
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respect to the divorce itself. However, the plaintiff
calls the court's attention to paragraph 7 of the
findings of Fact (R. 39) which specifically sets forth
the grounds upon which the decree was granted,
to-wit:
"During the marriage of the parties the
plaintiff has treated defendant cruelly causing
him great mental distress and suffering, and
more particularly: Plaintiff has in violation
of the marriage contract gone out with anoth·er man."
With respect to defendant's statement that
plaintiff fraudulently commenced this action, this
statement is not true. See R. 287 of the record,
wherein plaintiff testified with respect to the original
complaint:
"Q. You stated in your affidavit that
during the marriage of the parties Mr. Me
Broom had treated you cruelly causing you
great mental and physical distress and suffering.
"A. True.
"Q. More particularly, that the defendant drinks to excess.
"A. True.
"Q. He has a violent, ungovernable temper and on many occasions has physically beat
and abused you.
"A. True.
"Q. All this true?
"A. I don't know about "beating'' but he
has physically abused me.
1
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"Q. You are afraid he will do you bodily
harm?
"A. True.
"Q. Unless restrained and enjoined?
"A. T ru·e.
See also R. 360 and R. 395, R. 464, R. 565
of the record.
With respect to defendant's statement in his
brief that the plaintiff had persistently disappeared
from the home of the parties and stayed out all
night, the defendant is again quoting solely from
the testimony of Mr. McBroom without any corroboration whatsoever, and totally disregarding the
testimony of Mrs. McBroom. See R. 546, R. 533, R.
534.
With respect to the reconciliation of the parties
vvhich took place in September, 1962, plaintiff testified that she and the defendant (R. 211), after the
defendant had been away from home for approximately two weeks, discussed a lot of things between
them, including her going out with a Bertram Jarvis
and that they had both decided they had done things
in their marriage that were wrong and that were
not good for their marriage; and that they had
decided to let bygones be bygones and go from there.
The state1nents of defendant that plaintiff had been
carrying on an immoral and adulterous relationship with a married man are without basis in the
record; there is no testimony or evidence to support
said statements. See R. 201, 207, 209, 251, 298, 309,
3
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353. More significant than the testimony of either
one of these parties is the fact that the court did
not make a finding that there was any immoral or
adulterous relationship being carried on between
the plaintiff and any man.
With respect to the defendant's statement that
the plaintiff deliberately set out in her own handwriting a design, scheme and plan to commence
di·vorce and take from defendant his home, children
and livelihood, this is purely imagination on the
part of defendant. See Exhi'bit 6, also R. 214, 219
of the record wherein it states:
"July 22, 1961, be nice, but cold and definitely independent; be calm, quiet and considerate of the kids; do things with them;
remember he is no longer your husband you
are no longer his wife; you don't need him;
make your own decisions; move out of the
bedroom. If he insists on being a pig, do something, go to an attorney. Try it for one week;
make a list of the good and bad, then tell
him. The way you feel you couldn't be more
divorced legally than you are in your own
heart. From now on I will consider myself
divorced, I will not live with him as a wife.
If he cares to live here, he will be neat and
clean and keep the house in the same order
in which he finds it; otherwise I will be
forced to make it legal."
Certainly this testi1nony as introduced by the
defendant himself does not indicate in anyway an
intent on the part of the plaintiff to scheme and take
away the defendant's children, home and property;
4
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

but rather a sincere effort on plaintiff's part to
determine what was wron·g with their marriag·e and
attempt to correct the difficultes. Furthermore, the
statement of the defendant that 'the plaintiff had admitted in her own handwriting that her motive in attempting to terminate their marriage was not because of misconduct on the p·art of defendant but because of her reDa.tionship with Jarvis, is entirely untrue. See R. 191, 1'90, 19'3, 194, 195, 426, 19'7, 200,
214, '224, 245, 246, 218, 386, 388, 2'31, 256, 29'5, 296,
302, 306, 308, 316, 429, 551, 37 4, 455 an'd 402 wherein the plaintiff testified with respect to the defendant's drinking, the physical abuse, the defendant's relation with the other woman, Karen, his failure to assume any responsibility around the home with respect
to yard work or cleaning up and keeping the home in
proper order, or performing little tasks aroun d the
home which any ordinary husband should perform
such as installing a front porch light, which the defendan't would not do, and it was necessary for plaintiff to call in \a neighbor to help her install it, or watering the lawn or painting. S·ee further R. 545, 361,
368, 377, 379, 380, wherein the plaintiff testified that
defendant had not allowed her to sleep for three
nig;hts in a row; and wherein she pled with defendant to allow her to talk to Mr. Ralph McBroom,
the defendant's brother, and wherein the plaintiff
asked Mr. Ralph McBroom to please tell Howard
to let her get some sleep, that she was exhausted.
See R. 384 where the plaintiff testified that she
1
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requested the defendant to seek marriage couns·eling with her. Also R. 394, 397, 214, 404, 424, 426,
192,441,470,471,534,547,559,439,438,402. Areading of the record certainly indicates a stormy marriage for these people, and if fault there be, it lies
on the shoulders of both parties and not just one
of these parties. See R. 404 where the plaintiff
testified that defendant admitted to her he had
been going out with women from the time Kirt was
one year old.
Defendant's statem·ent in his brief wherein defendant testified that commencing in 1956 the plaintiff began disappearing from the home of the parties
and returning late at night under the influence of
alcohol, and the refusal of plaintiff to participate
in the activities of the family with the minor children. All of these statements were denied by the
plaintiff. See R. 546, 534, 573, 548, 245, 282, with
respect to the Lagoon outing, concerning which the
defendant makes such contention that the plaintiff
refused to go with him, when in truth and fact,
according to the plaintiff's testimony, the defendant
did not e·ven invite her. And on another occasion
when sh·e had stayed home to clean the house in
order that the defendant's brother and wife could
co1ne and visit then1 that evening for a birthday
celebration. R. 546, 571.
With respect to the statement of defendant that
plaintiff stayed with Jarvis in his home in Kearns,
the truth of the matter is that she 'Yas there in
6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

his home approximately 45 minutes. R. 284. Or,
that she had stayed in his apartment. She had been
at his apart1nent only long enough to help him put
some work pants on a stretcher, and then left. R.
301. And defendant's statement that she had b·een
a\vay in the canyons with him. This occurred on
one occasion, and she returned home before eight
o'clock in the evening.
It would seem strange that if the contentions
of the defendant are true, as he has set forth in
his brief, that the trial judge would not have made
findings of fact which were more consistent with
contentions of the defendant.
The defendant comments in his brief that the
plaintiff commenced using contraceptives in August
of 1961, when actually the contraceptives they speak
of were purchased back in 1955. See R. 453, also
R. 550, 551, wherein the plaintiff definitely testified that these contraceptives were never used for
intercourse with anybody other than her husband.
R. 550. The obvious conclusion is that they had
been used by plaintiff and defendant since they were
purchased in 1955.
At page 10 of the defendant's brief, defendant
seems to make light of the fact that plaintiff kept
a menstrual chart, Exhibit 21, which was a 1961
calendar. It is curious to note the notations which
were placed on said calendar. "Monthly Record."
"New toothbrushes." "Started 5-19-61 ended 9-10."
"H. drank and brought up the paper." "How long
7
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can I take it." Seven x's on December 19, 21, 22, 27,
29, 30 ,anid 31. Said "x'1s" indicating the days that
defendant was drinking. R. 360. "Saw him in front
of the Pecan 12-2." "What a year, I hope I never have
another one like that." Notations on the reverse side
of the 19'60 calendar are laS follows: "Monthly Record." "'He did it again." "Physical cruelty by Howard :before kids." "Mrs. Hall did not work." "Mrs.
Hall one half a day." '''Tendency to have headache."
With respect to the defendant's contention that
the plaintiff did not provide proper care for her
children, Mrs. McDonald, the children's school
teacher testified as follows R. 345:
"Q. You are familiar with Mrs. Me
Broom, are you not?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Is she active in any school organizations?
"A. Yes, she has been in PTA and always
showed deep concern for the welfare of the
children. I noticed it then and I notice it
now."
Further, at R. 513, the testimony of Mrs. Me
Donald:
"A. Yes she has. Just today the nominating committee asked her to serve as president of the PTA for the year 1962-63." (referring to Mrs. McBroom)
Further, on cross-exrunination of Mrs. McDonald by defendant's counsel: (R. 513)
"Q. Mrs. McDonald are you aware of the
8
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·evidence that has been presented at this proceeding?
"A. Part of it.
"Q. The nature of it?
"A. Part of it from what you read the
other day.
"Q. Did you advise the committee of
this?
"A. I had nothing to do with the committee.
"Q. I see, as far as you know the committee is not aware of any of this evidence?
"A. I think they are because the president of the PTA has called in to get quite a
lot of information.
"Q. Do you think they know quite a lot
about this?
"A. Didn't you call Mrs. Huffner?
"Q. I don't know.
"A. I think you did.
"Q. I interviewed quite a good many
witnesses.
"A. I think you did a pretty thorough
job.
"Q. In spite of the evidence the committee apparently still wants her to govern our
children in that area of the city?
"A. They may not accept your ·evidence."
With respect to the defendant's assertion that
he \vas a good father and that plaintiff had no concern when the children were with him, it is inter9
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esting to note the plaintiff's testimony R. 205:
"Q. When he has those children you
don't have to worry for one minute about
their welfare, do you?
"A. Not unless he is drinking."
To the defendant's contention on page 12 of
his brief that plaintiff arrived home in the early
morning hours under the influence of alcohol and
neglected her children; that she was physically unable to care for her children-such was denied by
the plaintiff. Certainly such testimony on the part
of the defendant was not believed by the trial judge,
otherwise he would not have found that plaintiff
was a fit and proper person to have custody of the
children. R. 38, 39.
With reference to the plaintiff attending church
at the Presbyterian Church, the plaintiff testified,
"I hav·e frequently attended the Presbyterian
Church, except when I was obviously not invited."
R. 56, 574.
Further, with respect to the plaintiff's caring
for the children properly, see the testimony of unbiased and unprejudiced neighbors of plaintiff and
defendant. The testimony of Mrs. Glade K. Jenson,
R. 514 to 517. The testimony of Mrs. Beverly Chase,
R. 355, 518, 519, 180. Mrs. Clarence R. Hall, in this
respect also, R. 506- 511. Laurence McCormick, R.
384 to 389.
With respect to defendant's inco1ne, th·e defendant's gross income was $8,200.00 for the year 1961,
10
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

with a net after deducting "automobile depreciation,
mileage and other expenses," of $547.00 per month.
R. 181. And \vhile at page 21 of defendant's brief,
the defendant is extolling his virtues as to being
a provider in the home, the plaintiff was also working and earning a monthly income of som·e $370.00
per month gross income, which the plaintiff was
contributing to the family expenses without the
benefit of "deductible expenses." Plaintiff's monthly
gross earnings at Kennecott were $370.00 per month
R. 185, from which plaintiff made her own monthly
payment on her automobile, R. 185. With reference
to plaintiff's earnings, see Exhibit 1 and particularly attached thereto the employee pay statem·ents
showing net earnings of $114.19 for one pay period
and $100.37 for the next pay period, showing a net
income of $214.56 per month. See also Exhibit 46.
It should be noted at this point that said paycheck stubs show a Credit Union deduction of $45.00
per pay period. Said Credit deductions are applied
as follows: $74.00 payment on plaintiff's automobile
and the balance used for taxes and insurance on
said automobile of plaintiff. R. 69, 66.
With respect to the defendant's statement on
page 32 of his brief, that the plaintiff offered no
evidence of a constructive progam for the care and
protection of the children. Reference should be made
to the testimony of the neighbors and school teacher,
whose testimony the plaintiff offered, and compare
the same with the naturally biased testimony which
11
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the defendant offered through his 77 year old
mother, anld :Mrs. R. A. McBroom, who h.as five children of her own to care for, and is th·e wife of the
defendant's brother, Mr. Ralph McBroom.
Admittedly the plaintiff must leave the children
\Vith baby tend·ers while she is at work. However,
the defendant could offer no other alternative. Surely if the defendant wants to pay sufficient to ·enable
the plaintiff to stay home and care for the children
on a full-time basis, she would be perfectly willing
to do so. However, apparently he was not concerned
about this during the four-year period during th·eir
marriage that the plaintiff was working. See defendant's brief page 53.

-:

With reference to the Exhibits 28 through 37,
pictures and other written documents, certainly
the defendant was aware of these items being in
the home. By the plaintiff's own testimony she did
not e·ven recall these items. R. 334, 335, 336. If the
defendant had been so shocked and disgusted at
these exhibits, certainly he would hav·e destroyed
them on his own in May of 1961 when he claims to
have discovered them and would not have waited
until January 15 of 1962 to take them with him when
he removed his "financial records" from the hom·e.

12
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING CUSTODY
OF THE MINOR CHILDREN OF THE PARTIES TO THE PLAINTIFF.

Even though defendant was awarded the divorce
in this matter, the lower court specifically found
plaintiff a fit and proper person to be awared the
care, custody and control of the minor children of
the parties. Defendant's assertions, "that plaintiff
visited insidious and immoral depravity upon the
children" is not supported by the record and the
lower court specifically found to the contrary.
In the case of SMITH v. SMITH, 1 Utah 2d 75,
77, 262 P.2d 283, 284, this court stated:
"The determining issue h·ere is what will
be for the best interest of the child. This is
an ultimate question of fact which the trial
court found in the mother's favor. Child custody cases are equitable in nature and so we
must review both the law and the facts. Here
we have a double problem of determining not
only the occurrences and ·events here involved
but the much more uncertain and controversial problem of trying to look into the future
and see the effect on the happin·ess and well
being of the child each course will bring, and
thus determine which course will be for the
best interest of the child. In making this
decision we must keep in mind that the trial
court saw and heard the witnesses when they
gave their testimony and is thus in a much
better position to understand and evaluate
their testimony than we are from reading
13
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the cold record. This is particularly true in
determining which will best serve the interest
of the child, for the trial court has seen the
contestants in action, has observed their personalities, manners and attitudes, and has had
the opportunity to evaluate the ability of each
of the parties concerned to win the friendship, confidence, love and control of the child
and the affect on its life that association with
each of such parties may have. In view of
these facts we hesitate to over turn the findings of the trial court unless we find them
·evidently erroneous."
See also WALTON v. KAUFMAN, 110 Utah 1,
169 P.2d 97; BRIGGS v. BRIGGS, 111 Utah 418,
181 P.2d 223; SAMPSELL v. HOLT, 115 Utah 73,
202 P.2d 550; STUBER v. STUBER, 121 Utah 632,
.244 P.2d 650.
The obvious conclusion from the evidence is that
the trial court concluded that plaintiff was better
suited to have the custody of the children awarded
to her, and to this effect the court so found and
so stated in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Decree.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING PLAINTIFF $200.00 PER MONTH FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE TWO
MINOR CHILDREN, THE HOME OF THE PARTIES, THE FURNITURE AND FIXTURES IN THE HOME EXCEPT FOR CERTAIN
ITEMS AWARDED TO DEFENDANT, AND THE PLAINTIFF'S
OWN AU'TOMOBILE.

Defendant's gross income for th·e year 1961
was $8200.00 with a net after deducting "automobile
depreciation, mileage and other expenses," of some
$547.00 per month R. 181. In addition to the $200.00
14
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per month stlpport money for the two minor children, defendant was ordered to assume the obligation to the Seaboard Finance Co. payable at the
rate of $31.00 per month, and to pay the loan on the
stereo to Walker Bank, which loan amounted to
$114.00 at the rate of $19.00 per month, and which
should ha:ve been paid off by the 1st day of January,
1963. R. 68, 69. Said stereo was awarded to the
defendant as his sole and separate property. The
plaintiff on the other hand was ordered to assume
and pay the obligation on her own automobile
amounting to $74.00 per .month, which obligation
the plaintiff is still paying. Defendant's statement
in his brief at page 48 to the effect that plaintiff
has a net income of $370.00 per month from her
employment is entirely erron.eous, as the defendant
vvell knows th·e plaintiff's gross monthly earnings
were $370.00 with net nearings of $214.56 per month
ater the credit union deduction. See exhibit 46. The
defendant in his affidavit in support of his motion
to amend the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Decree specifically stated that the total amount
of his monthly obligations, in addition to the $200.00
per month support money, amounted to the sum
of $146.00 per month. R. 68, 69. The plaintiff, in
addition to the foregoing, must make the monthly
payment on the home of the parties in the sum of
$82.50 per month. Based upon the foregoing, it is
obvious that the trial court had sufficient basis
upon which to make a finding that the defendant
15
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should pay the sum of $100.00 per month per child
and the additional sum of $1.00 per year as alimony.
The plaintiff's as well as the d·efendant's accumulated earnings enabled the parties to acquire the
home and furnishings of the parties. The fact that
the court awarded the home and furnishings to the
plaintiff is further evidence that the court considered
the plaintiff to be a fit and proper person to have
custody of the children, and that the hom·e and
furnishings were necessary to enable her to properly
care for said children. Here again the recent decisions of this court have afiirmed the position that
the distribution of property by the trial court should
not be interfered with unless th·ere is indicated a
clear abuse of discretion.
In the case of WILSON v. WILSON, 5 Utah
2d 79 page 84, 296 P.2d 977, the court stated:
"It is true, as defendant contends, that
a divorce proceeding is equitable and that it
is within the prerogative of this court to review the evidenee and to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court under proper
circumstances. The more recent pronouncements of this court, and the policy to which
w·e adhere, are to the effect that the trial
judge has considerable latitude and discrimination in such matters, and that his judgment should not be changed lightly, and in
fact, not at all, unless it were such a manifest
injustice or inequity as to indicate a clear
abus·e of discretion."
16
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See also McDONALD v. McDONALD, 120 Utah
573, 236 P.2d 1066; LAWLOR v. LAWLOR, 240 P.2d
271; 121 Utah 201.
The property of the parties although meager
in nature was accumulated by the joint efforts and
earnings of both parties and the fact that the trial
court awarded the home and furnishings to the
plaintiff does not represent an abuse of discretion.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING PLAINTIFF $1.00 PER YEAR ALIMONY AND $750.00 ATTORNEYS
FEES.

Defendant's statement to the effect that the
plaintiff's suit was commenced fraudulently is entirely groundless as shown by plaintiff's statement of
facts. With respect to the question of attorneys
fees being awarded to the plaintiff, the defendant
cites the case of Holm v. Holm, 44 Utah 242, 139 P.
937, and Graziano v. Gr1aziano, 7 Utah 2d 187, 321
P.2d 931. Certainly the Graziano case is in no way
comparable to the situation in the case at bar. In
the Graziano case the defendant husband had no
income except as an inducted G.I. soldier. And in
that instance the plaintiff wife declared her ability
to take care of her own needs. Th·e case of Holm v.
Holm is similar to that of the Graziano case, and
is not comparable to the case at bar.
As the court can readily determine from the
voluminous record in this case, considerable time
was spent in the preparation and trial of this action,
17
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the actual trial lasting four days. The lower court
in making an award of counsel fees to the plaintiff
specifically stated R. 43:
"Defendant is hereby ordered to pay to
plaintiff to assist her in paying her attorneys
fees the sum of $750.00 and plaintiff is hereby
awarded judgment against defendant for said
amount."
It was specifically agreed between plaintiff and defendant that the question of attorneys fees and the
amount thereof would be left to the discretion of
the trial judge. R. 410.
This court has said on many occasions that it
will not substitute its judgment in a divorce proceeding relative to alimony and division of property
for that of the trial court unless the record clearly
discloses that the trial court's decree in such matter
is plainly arbitrary. See ALLEN v. ALLEN, 109
Utah 99, 165 P.2d 872. Certainly there is no showing
that the trial court abused its discretion or was
arbitrary in this matter. The court felt that in
view of the necessity for the plaintiff to work to
assist in the support and maintenance of herself and
the minor children, and th·e income of defendant,
that the retention of $1.00 per year as alimony
was necessary and proper. The necessity of plaintiff
making application for alimony in the event of illn·ess
or other matters rendering her destitute would require such protection.
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Furthermore, the awarding of $750.00 attorneys
fees to the plaintiff to assist her in pay.ment of her
counsel fees is not unreasonable and does not show
an abuse of discretion on the part of the lower
court.
Respectfully submitted,
LELA,ND S. McCULLOUGH
304 East First South
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
Attorney for Plaintiff and
Respondent
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